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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW-SToP AND FRisK-Terry v. Ohio RATIONALE APPLIED
TO STOP AND FRISK IN NEW YoRK.
In March, 1966, a New York City patrolman while on foot patrol was told
by an anonymous passerby of an occurrence involving a man with a pistol. The
patrolman's investigation led him to a bar in the area where he obtained a
description of the suspect, said to have discharged a firearm or firecracker
moments earlier on the street. As the officer was leaving the bar, a second
passerby pointed to the defendant identifying him as the man with the gun. The
patrolman ordered the defendant, who fit the description given in the bar, to
stop. The officer then proceeded to pat the defendant's outer clothing and felt
what appeared to be a gun. The officer reached into the defendant's jacket,
removed a loaded .25 caliber automatic, and then arrested the defendant charg-
ing him with unlawful possession of a weapon. The defendant moved to suppress
the introduction of the pistol into evidence on the grounds that the search was
not incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause. This motion was denied
by the lower court and the defendant was subsequently convicted. The Appel-
late Division affirmed without opinion.1 The New York Court of Appeals also
affirmed rejecting the argument as to the legality of the search. Held, although
the officer had no probable cause to arrest the defendant until after the gun
was found, the information supplied by the anonymous passerby was sufficient
to create that degree of reasonable suspicion required to justify a constitutionally
permissible stop and frisk. People v. Arthurs, 24 N.Y.2d 688, 249 N.E.2d 462,
301 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1969).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects an
individual from unreasonable searches and seizures.2 A search or seizure is
deemed reasonable if executed pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable
cause.3 In order for a police officer to obtain an arrest or search warrant, he
must demonstrate to the issuing magistrate that he has substantial reason to
believe that an offense has been committed, is being committed, or will be
committed.4 If he relies upon an informer's disclosure, the officer must clearly
articulate in his affidavit the reasons he believes the informer to be reliableu and
the informer's reasons for believing that illegal activity is occurring.6 The lack
of a warrant does not necessarily make a search or seizure unreasonable. In the
case of a warrantless arrest, the existence of probable cause may be found after
the fact by deciding that, had the officer an opportunity to get an arrest
1. People v. Arthurs, 30 A.D.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1969).
2. The above provision is made applicable to the states via the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
4. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
5. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
6. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) ; Note, 59 A.B.AJ. 360, 361 (1969).
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warrant, one would have been granted.7 As long as the arrest is lawful, an
incidental warrantless search is sanctioned." Such searches are justified to
protect the officer from danger which might result if the suspect were armed
and, in addition, to insure that any contraband which the suspect might possess
will not be destroyed. Furthermore, warrantless searches are deemed reasonable
if made with the consent of the accused9 or if made in hot pursuit of the
suspect.'0
In an effort to combat the ever rising crime rate, some states, both by
judicial decision"l and by statute,' 2 have sanctioned a procedure which is
commonly known as "stop and frisk." This procedure permits a police officer
to stop, question and "frisk" persons whom he reasonably suspects are involved
in criminal activity. After such a stop, an officer who reasonably suspects that
he is in physical danger, is permitted to search such persons for dangerous
weapons. In 1964 the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Rivera,13 had
its first occasion to determine the constitutional validity of stop and frisk.'4 In
Rivera, three New York City detectives observed two men acting suspiciously
in front of a tavern.' 5 When the defendant realized that he was being observed
by the police he quickly walked away. One of the detectives stopped and
frisked him finding a loaded weapon. The defendant was arrested and charged
with unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeals held
that stopping suspicious individuals for questioning is not equivalent to an
7. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
8. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 41 (1961); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
9. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964).
10. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
11. See, e.g., State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966); Common-
wealth v. Balou, 350 Mass. 751, 217 N.E.2d 187, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1031 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 201 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966); People v. Simon, 45 Cal.
2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961); People
v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956). For a thorough discussion of the stop and
frisk doctrine, see Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse of
E-uphemisms, 57 J. Cn . L., C. & P.S. 257 (1966); Schwartz, Stop and Frisk: A Case
Study in Judicial Control of the Police, 58 J. Cnrm. L., C. & P.S. 433 (1967); LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIDCH. L.
REv. 40 (1969).
12. See, e.g., CAL. PEmq. CODE § 833 (1957); Dr. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 1902-1903;
HAWAI REV. LAWS, §§ 255-4&5 (1955); MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (1961); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 544.170 (1959); NEB. LAWS, ch. 132, at 471 (1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 594:2-594:3 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 12-7-1, 12-7-2 (1956).
13. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1964);
Note, So Coimr L.Q. 529 (1965).
14. It is important to note that the decision in Rivera was not based on the New York
stop and frisk law (N.Y. CODE CP.ML PROC. § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1967)) although the
statute was already in effect, since the facts of the case occurred before July 1, 1964 (the
date the statute became effective).
15. The arresting officer described the behavior of the two men as follows: "They
walked up in front, outside a bar and grill, stopped, looked in the window, continued to
walk a few steps, came back, and looked in the window again." People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d
441, 444, 201 N.E.2d 32, 33, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (1964).
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arrest and does not have to be based upon probable cause. The majority con-
cluded that a frisk is not tantamount to a search and is permissible if made
pursuant to a lawful stop.16 In rejecting the defendant's contention that his
fourth amendment rights had been violated the court stated:
The constitutional restriction is against unreasonable searches, not
against all searches. And what is reasonable always involves a balanc-
ing of interests: here the security of the public order and the lives of
the police are to be weighed against a minor inconvenience and petty
indignity..7
In People v. Peters8 and People v. Sibron,10 the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of New York's stop and frisk law.20 In
Peters, an off-duty policeman heard strange noises outside the door of his apart-
ment. Looking through a peephole in his door, he observed two men tiptoeing
strangely towards the stairs. Suspecting that the men were contemplating a
burglary, the officer gave chase and apprehended one defendant. The officer
frisked him and felt a hard object which proved to be an envelope containing
burglar's tools. In Sibron, a police officer, over a period of several hours, ob-
served the defendant conversing with known narcotics addicts. Although the
officer heard no part of these conversations nor saw the physical transfer of
what might have been narcotics, he followed the defendant into a restaurant
and ordered him to step outside. Once outside, the officer said: "You know what
I am looking for."121 Defendant mumbled inaudibly and reached into his pocket.
Simultaneously, the officer thrust his hand into the same pocket and recovered
several glassine envelopes which, upon examination, were found to contain
heroin. In both cases, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
In both, the court categorized the frisk by the officer as a self-protecting one,
thereby indicating that the authority conferred upon the police by section
180-a would be broadly construed. Under the Sibron and Peters rationale, as
long as the frisk can be justified under the statute as self-protective, the fruits
16. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
17. Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
18. 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
19. 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966). On subsequent appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, Sibron's conviction was reversed. The Court found that
on the facts of the case the officer engaged in a search for evidence, rather than a self-pro-
tective search. The issue of the validity of section 180-a was not decided. For further
discussion of the Court's reasoning in the reversal see text accompanying notes 24-27 intira.
20. N.Y. CoDE Canm. PRoC. § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the offenses
specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a
dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession
of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the
questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person.
21. 18 N.Y.2d at 603, 219 N.E.2d at 197, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
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of the frisk, whether dangerous weapons or other contraband, provide an ade-
quate basis for arrest and are admissible into evidence against the accused.
The court ended all doubt as to how liberally it would construe the statute
with its decision in People v. Taggart.22 In Taggart, the police were informed
by an anonymous telephone call that a youth with a loaded revolver in his
jacket pocket was standing at a particular corner. The youth was carefully
described by the informer and an officer was dispatched to the scene. Upon
spotting the youth standing in the midst of a group of children, the officer
approached him and, without questioning or frisking, immediately inserted his
hand into the youth's pocket, removing a loaded weapon. The New York Court
of Appeals, in affirming the defendant's conviction, held that, although the
anonymous tip did not give the officer probable cause to arrest and search the
defendant, the search was nevertheless valid under the stop and frisk law. The
majority reasoned that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
defendant was armed and hence dangerous. Faced with the difficult problem
of justifying a search not preceded by a preparatory frisk, the court stated:
[I]n all but one of the court's decisions on this point, the arresting
officers engaged in "searches" rather than "frisks" in order to obtain
inculpating evidence. In People v. Pugach, the evidence was discovered
in a closed briefcase. The officer in People v. Sibron, without first
frisking the defendant, reached into his pocket and pulled out the
narcotics. In People v. Teams, it appears only that the officers
"searched" Teams and found a revolver. . . . In short, there is ample
authority to uphold the legality of the search in this case.23
In so holding, the court explicitly overturned the careful distinction between a
frisk and a search which it formulated in the Rivera case. In effect the court
held that section 180-a authorizes not only a frisk but, under certain circum-
stances, an actual search of the suspect based on reasonable suspicion alone.
The Supreme Court of the United States has taken a different view regard-
ing the practice of stop and frisk. In Terry v. Ohio24 the Court upheld, within
narrowly circumscribed boundaries, the constitutionality of stop and frisk. In
Terry a veteran detective observed three men acting suspiciously in front of a
jewelry store. 25 Suspecting that a robbery was about to take place, the officer
stopped the defendant and frisked him. The frisk produced a loaded weapon.
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of an unlawful
weapon, and held that where a police officer observes an individual engaging
in unusual conduct, which leads him to reasonably believe that criminal activity
may be afoot, he may stop the individual and make reasonable inquiries as to
his activities. In addition, if the officer believes that his own safety and the
safety of others may be in danger, he may conduct a carefully limited search of
22. 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
23. Id. at 342, 229 N.E.2d at 586, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
24. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Note, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 178 (1968).
25. 392 U.S. at 6.
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the outer clothing of the suspect in an attempt to discover dangerous weapons. 20
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the contention that a stop and
frisk is a lesser form of restraint than a traditional arrest and search and, as
such, should not be governed by the fourth amendment. 27 While recognizing
that the practice of stop and frisk comes within the scope of the fourth amend-
ment, the Court also realized that a purely protective search for weapons pre-
dicated upon on the spot police observation and requiring prompt police action
was necessary to protect the officer from physical harm. Hence, the Court
authorized such a search if the judgment of a reasonably prudent man would
support the assertion that he was in physical danger.
On appeal, the Court reversed the conviction in Sibron v. New York.
28
Basing its reversal upon a narrow construction of its newly formed reasonable
man test, the Court concluded that upon the facts presented, the search could
not be regarded as a purely protective search for weapons, but rather as a
search for evidence. As such, the probable cause requirement rather than the
reasonable man test was the criterion which the police had to meet. The Court
affirmed defendant's conviction in Peters v. New York, 29 concluding that the
facts demonstrated that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant.
By finding the requisite probable cause to be present, the Court avoided the
issue of whether contraband, other than weapons discovered as a result of stop
and frisk, would be admissible evidence.2 0 In both Sibron and Peters, the Court,
had it wished to, could have ruled upon the constitutionality of section 180-a
but, in both cases, avoided the issue. In Sibron, the Court explicitly stated that
it would not "be drawn into what we view as the abstract and unproductive
exercise of laying the extraordinarily elastic categories of § 180-a next to the
categories of the Fourth Amendment in an effort to determine whether [they]
are ... compatible."
31
In the instant case, the New York Court of Appeals held that the police
officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to effectuate a constitutionally
permissible stop and frisk. The court based its decision on the Terry rationale
rather than on the broadly construed New York stop and frisk statute. Ap-
parently the court realized that the Supreme Court would not go along with
a broad construction of the statute since it reversed in Sibron, and avoided
deciding the reasonableness of the stop and frisk altogether in Peters. Further-
more, the court may have been influenced by the Supreme Court's refusal to
rule upon the constitutionality of section 180-a in both the Sibron and Peters
26. Id. at 30-31.
27. This contention had been previously accepted by some federal courts. Sce, e.g.,
United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
28. 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Note, 82 HARv. L. REv. 178 (1968).
29. 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Note, 37 FOPuDHAa L. REV. 300 (1968).
30. It should be noted that Justice Harlan's concurring opinion was based on his
finding that there had been a valid stop and frisk, rather than that the officer had probable
cause to arrest. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74-79 (1968).
31. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, $9 (1968).
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cases. The court concluded that the officer had engaged in a protective search
for weapons. The fact that he did not observe the defendant's conduct, but
relied on information supplied by an anonymous passerby, did not detract from
the reasonableness of his actions. The court found that the information supplied
was highly reliable since it was detailed and specific. In addition it was given
".... by a number of individuals, who because of their physical separation were
not likely to have been acting in concert.13 2 Although the court granted that
the absence of the names of the informers made it impossible to verify the
officer's testimony, it regarded such corroboration unnecessary. Pointing out
that the occurrence upon which it was asked to rule was a street encounter, the
court concluded that it would be "requiring the impossible" from the police
to document the names of every person from whom they obtained information.33
In light of the increasing incidence of crime in our society the practice of
"stop and frisk" is essential to the maintenance of law and order. By permitting
law enforcement agents to detain and frisk individuals whom they reasonably
suspect to be involved in criminal activity, the dual objectives of deterring
violent crimes and protecting officers from physical harm are advanced. Simul-
taneously, however, the most stringent precautions must be taken in order to
insure the individual's right to be protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Toward safeguarding these fourth amendment rights, the basis for
the stop and frisk in each individual case should be carefully analyzed. A dis-
tinction must be drawn between a protective stop and frisk which is based on
the officer's personal observation and reasonable assessment that a crime is
about to be perpetrated, and a stop and frisk based on an informer's disclosure.
In the former, specialized training and experience in law enforcement is said
to enable the officer to make a fairly reliable determination that given behavior
is reasonably suspicious. For example, in Terry, a veteran detective personally
observed the defendant casing the store, thereby concluding that the defendant
was about to commit a robbery.
In the informer situation, a layman's judgment serves as the basis for the
officer's action. Since the practice of stop and frisk generally occurs in the con-
text of a street encounter, the police officer has neither the opportunity to
determine whether the informer is reliable, nor the opportunity to question the
informer as to his reasons for believing that a crime has been or is being com-
mitted. For example, the officer in the instant case did not base his belief that
a crime had been committed upon his own observations. His actions were solely
based on the anonymous information he received. In Spinelli v. United States34
the Supreme Court concluded that if an officer relies upon an informer's dis-
closure in order to obtain a search warrant, the officer in his affidavit must
clearly articulate his reasons for believing that the informer is reliable, as well
32. People v. Arthurs, 24 N.Y.2d 688, 692; 249 N.E.2d 462, 465; 301 N.Y.S.2d 614,
618 (1969).
33. Id. at 693, 249 N.E.2d at 465, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
34. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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as the informer's reasons for believing the occurrence of illegal activity. The
underlying reason for these requirements was to subject the reliability and the
motive of the informer to judicial scrutiny. In Terry v. Ohio35 the Court left no
doubt that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing,
however denominated by the police or statute, is a search. Chief Justice Warren
speaking for the majority said:
it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to
suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not
a 'search.'
36
Similarly, in People v. Taggart37 the New York Court of Appeals also equated
a "frisk" with a search. Arguably, therefore, the Spinelli requirements for a
search warrant (in an informer situation) are applicable to frisks based upon an
informer's disclosures. It is clear that in Arthurs, neither of the Spinelli re-
quirements were met. Neither the reliability of the informer, nor his reasons for
believing that the defendant was armed were subjected to judicial scrutiny. In
fact, the officer himself could not attest to the reliability of the informers since
he was unacquainted with them. Not only does the instant case fail to meet
the Spinelli requirements, but it fails to meet the Terry test as well. The officer
did not engage in a self-protective search based on his own observations but
relied entirely on the unsubstantiated disclosures of informers. For the above
reasons, the United States Supreme Court, if and when they are called upon
to decide a case similar to Arthurs, may find it very difficult to agree with
the Court of Appeals that as a matter of law the officer possessed the requisite
reasonable suspicion to effectuate a constitutionally permissible stop and frisk.
Although the instant case does not comply with the requirements set down
in Spinelli for the issuance of a warrant based on an informer's disclosures, it
is at least conceivable that the Supreme Court would uphold the procedures
followed by the police in the instant case. The Court may be persuaded that
where a search warrant is requested time is not the crucial element. The police
have the opportunity to collect and substantiate their information carefully
before taking action against the criminal activity involved. The intervention
of a neutral and disinterested magistrate is desirable where time is not of the
essence and threat of harm to innocent citizens is remote. Conversely, in the
"on the street" situation time is of the essence; the potential threat to life and
property is much greater. In Arthurs the defendant was in possession of a
deadly weapon which allegedly he had already used at least once previously.
Similarly, Terry involved the potentially violent crime of armed robbery. These
situations dictate rapid and effective police action to negate the potential danger
involved. The Court may be unwilling to transplant the requirement of judicial
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
36. Id. at 16.
37. 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
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scrutiny which it considered desirable in the warrant situation. It may conclude
that what in one instance reflects the proper balance between the rights of the
individual and society would unduly jeopardize the rights of society in the other.
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